Husserl’s Phenomenological Method

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) advocated phenomenology as the first philosophy, a universal science that provides a basis for all sciences.

Phenomenology deals with consciousness, which makes up theories of the sciences and with which an object is cognized. He starts with the absolute certainty of Descartes’ “I think,” and while excluding the metaphysical dogmas underlying traditional philosophies, he examined consciousness as a strict science. He tried to clarify pure consciousness intuitively, rejecting all preconceptions.

In so doing, he made “To things themselves!” his motto. The word “things” here, does not refer to empirical facts, but rather to pure phenomena that manifest themselves within pure consciousness. He sought to describe these phenomena intuitively, just as they are. According to Husserl, first we should exclude empirical elements from things, and then we grasp the essence intuitively and then grasp the internal essence of consciousness, and finally analyze the structure of a priori pure consciousness.

Our everyday view regarding the natural world lying before us as self-evident is called the “natural attitude.” In this natural attitude there are, however, deep-rooted habits and preconceptions at work, and therefore, the world thus cognized can not be the true world. Thus, the “natural attitude” must change to a “phenomenological attitude,” Husserl stated. For that purpose, we need to pass through the two stages of “eidetic reduction” and “transcendental reduction.” The term “eidetic reduction,” for Husserl, refers to entering from the factual world into the world of essence. What takes place at this point is the intuition of essences through “free variation.” In other words, when one changes existing individual beings through free imagination, and when something universal and unchanging, regardless of the variation, is intuited, one has reached the essence. For example, the essence of flower can be obtained by examining a rose, a tulip, a bud, a withering flower, etc., and extracting something unchangeable from all of these observations.

The next step that takes place is that of “transcendental reduction.” This is carried out by stopping our judgment about whether the world does or does not exist. This does not mean to deny or doubt the existence of the external world, but to “suspend,” or “bracket,” our judgment. This process is called phenomenological epochē.

What remains after being bracketed (excluded) is “pure consciousness,” or “transcendental consciousness.” What appears in this consciousness is “pure phenomena.” This kind of attitude of seeking to comprehend pure phenomena is the phenomenological attitude (see fig. 11.1).

When we inquire into the general structure of pure consciousness, we find that it consists of noesis, which is the intentional act, and noema, which is the objective content the act refers to. The relationship between them is as that between “to think” and “to be thought.” In this way, phenomenology tries faithfully to describe pure consciousness.