3. Epistemologies in Terms of Method

As we have seen, empiricism, which saw experience as the origin of cognition, developed into skepticism, whereas rationalism, which saw reason as the origin of cognition, developed into dogmatism. They reached these conclusions because they did not examine the questions of how experience becomes truth, and how cognition is made through reason, in other words, the method of cognition. It was Hegel, Marx and Kant who attached importance to the method of cognition. I will introduce here the main points of the Kantian and Marxian methods.

3.1. Kant’s Transcendental Method

British empiricism fell into skepticism, and Continental rationalism fell into dogmatism, but Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) synthesized these two positions and established a new viewpoint. He considered empiricism to be mistaken because it ascribed cognition to experience, disregarding the function of reason, whereas on the other hand, rationalism was mistaken because it regarded reason as almighty. Thus, Kant held that in order to obtain true knowledge, one has to start from an analysis of how experience can become knowledge. To achieve this, one has to examine, or critique, the function of reason.

Kant wrote three books of critique, namely, Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgment, which, respectively, deal with how truth is possible, how good is possible, and how judgment of taste is possible. Accordingly, Kant dealt with the realization of the values of truth, goodness, and beauty. Among his works, the one concerned with epistemology is his Critique of Pure Reason.

Main Points of the Critique of Pure Reason

Kant tried to unify empiricism and rationalism on the basis of the fact that knowledge increases through experience, and that correct knowledge must have universal validity. It is self-evident that cognition starts from experience. Then, Kant proposed that there existed within the subject of cognition “certain a priori forms of cognition.” In other words, the object of cognition is established when the sense content (which is also called material, sensation, manifold of sense, or sense data) coming from the object is put in order by the a priori forms of the subject. All former philosophies had held that the object is grasped as it is; in contrast, Kant said that the object of cognition is actually synthesized by the subject. Through this insight, Kant believed he had effected a Copernican revolution in philosophy. Thus, Kant’s epistemology did not seek to obtain knowledge of the object itself, but sought to clarify how objective truthfulness might be obtained. He called it the “transcendental method.”

For Kant, cognition is a judgment. A judgment is made in terms of a proposition, and in a proposition there are subject and predicate. Knowledge increases through a judgment (a proposition), in which a new concept that is not contained in the subject appears in the predicate. Kant called such a judgment a “synthetic judgment.” In contrast, a judgment in which the concept of the predicate is already contained in the concept of the subject is called an “analytical judgment.” Hence, new knowledge is obtained only through a synthetic judgment.

Among the examples given by Kant of analytical and synthetic judgments, there are the following: the judgment that “all bodies are extended” is an analytical judgment, for the concept of body already includes the meaning that it has extension. On the other hand, the judgment that “between two points, the straight line is the shortest line” is a synthetic judgment, for the concept of a straight line indicates only the feature of straightness without containing the quantity of length or shortness. Therefore, the concept of the shortest line is a completely new addition.

Yet, even though new knowledge can be obtained through synthetic judgment, it can not become correct knowledge if it does not have universal validity. In order for knowledge to have universal validity, it should not be merely empirical knowledge, but should have some a priori element independent of experience. That is, in order for a synthetic judgment to have universal validity, it must be an a priori cognition, namely, an a priori synthetic judgment. So, Kant had to cope with the question: “How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?” ⁹

Content and Form

Kant tried to accomplish the synthesis of empiricism and rationalism through the unity of content and form. “Content” refers to the representations given to our senses through the stimuli from the things in the external world, namely, the content of our mind. Since the content is material coming from the outside, it is an a posteriori, empirical element. On the other hand, “form” refers to the framework, or determinative, that synthesizes or unifies the material, or the manifold of sense.

It is the framework that unifies various materials formed in the stage of sensation. In other words, sense content is synthesized by a priori forms. A priori forms consist of the forms of intuition that arrange the manifold of sense in the frame of time and space, and the forms of thought that gives the frame to cognition in the stage of understanding. He argued that, through these a priori forms, synthetic judgments with universal validity become possible.

The forms of intuition are frameworks that perceive the manifold of sense in space and time. Cognition, however, does not take place through intuition alone. Kant said that it is necessary for the object to be thought through understanding, and asserted that a priori concepts, the forms of thought, exist within understanding. In other words, he held that cognition takes place when the content, which is perceived intuitively, and the forms of thought are combined. Kant described it in the following way: “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.” ¹⁰

Kant named the a priori concepts within the understanding “pure concepts of understanding” or “categories.” Based on the judgment forms used in general logic since Aristotle, Kant derived the following twelve categories:

1. Quantity: unity, totality, plurality.

2. Quality: reality, negation, limitation.

3. Relation: substance, casuality, reciprocity.

4. Modality: possibility, actuality, necessity.

In this way, Kant asserted that cognition becomes possible as the sense content is perceived through the forms of intuition and is thought through the forms of thought (categories). Yet, the sense content in the stage of sensation and the forms of thought in the stage of the understanding are not combined automatically. Sensation and understanding are both faculties of cognition, but they are essentially different. A third force common to the two faculties is necessary. That is the power of imagination (Einbildingkraft), with which sense content and the forms of thought are unified, whereby fragmented manifold of sense is synthesized and unified.

Thus, the object of cognition, as Kant says, is the result of the synthesis of the sense content and the forms of thought through the power of imagination. Hence, the object of cognition is not what exists objectively in the external world, but rather it is synthesized in the process of cognition. We can understand, therefore, that the object of cognition, as Kant says, is something in which the a posteriori element of empiricism and the a priori element of rationalism are unified. The consciousness at the time of cognition should not be empirical or fragmentary, but there must be a pure consciousness underlying empirical consciousness, which has the power to unify. Kant called it “consciousness in general,” “pure apperception,” or “transcendental apperception.” As for the question of how the functions of sensation and understanding are connected, Kant said that imagination serves as the mediator between the two, as mentioned above.

Denial of Metaphysics and the Thing-in-itself

In this way, Kant discussed how certain knowledge is possible in the phenomenal world, namely, in the natural sciences or mathematics, and then examined whether or not metaphysics is possible. Since a metaphysical entity has no sense content, and therefore, can not become an object of perception, it can not be perceived. Since, however, the function of our reason is related to understanding alone and not directly to sensation, there are some cases in which one has an illusion whereby something that does not really exist appears to exist. Kant called this type of illusion “transcendental illusion.” The transcendental illusion consist of three types: the idea of the soul, the idea of the world, and the idea of God. ¹¹

Among these, he called the idea of the world, namely, the cosmological illusion, the antinomy of pure reason. This means that when reason pursues the infinite being (the infinite world), it will reach two entirely opposite conclusions from the same basis of argument. An example of this is the two contradictory propositions: “the world has a beginning in time and is also limited in regard to space” (the thesis) and “the world has no beginning in time and no limits in space, but is infinite in respect to both time and space” (the antithesis). Kant held this to be an error derived from trying to grasp the sense content as the world itself.

Kant held that cognition takes place only to the extent that the sense content coming from the object is synthesized through the a priori forms of the subject, and that the object itself, namely, the “thing-in-itself,” can never be cognized. This is the agnosticism of Kant. The world of “things-in-themselves” is the reality lying behind phenomena, and is called the “noumenal reality.” Nevertheless, Kant did not totally deny the world of things in themselves. In his Critique of Practical Reason, he held that noumenal reality is to be postulated in order to establish morality. He also claimed that, in order for noumenal reality to exist, freedom, the immortality of soul, and the existence of God must be postulated.

3.2. Marxist Epistemology

Next, I will explain the epistemology that is based on the materialist dialectic. This is called Marxist epistemology, or the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge.

Theory of Reflection (Copy Theory)

According to the materialist dialectic, the spirit (consciousness) is a product or a function of the brain, ¹² and cognition takes place as objective reality is reflected (copied) onto consciousness. This theory is called the “theory of reflection” or “copy theory” (teoriya otrazhenia). Of this, Engels said, “we comprehended the concepts in our heads once more materialistically―as images [Abbilder] of real things.” ¹³ Lenin stated that, “From Engels’ point of view, the only immutability is the reflection by the human mind (when there is a human mind) of an external world existing and developing independently of the mind.” ¹⁴ In Marxist epistemology, what Kant called sense content is not the only reflection of the objective world upon consciousness. The forms of thought are also the reflection of the objective world; they are the reflection of the forms of existence.

Sensory Cognition, Rational Cognition, and Practice

Cognition is not merely a reflection of the objective world, but it has to be verified through practice, according to Marxist epistemology. Lenin explains this process as follows: “From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice,―such is the dialectical path of the cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality.” ¹⁵

Mao Ze-dong explained the process of dialectical materialist cognition more concretely in the following quotes:

This dialectical-materialist theory of the process of development of knowledge, basing itself on practice and proceeding from the shallower to the deeper, was never worked out by anybody before the rise of Marxism…. Marxism-Leninism holds that each of the two stages in the process of cognition has its own characteristics, with knowledge manifesting itself as perceptual at the lower stage and logical at the higher stage, but that both are stages in an integrated process of cognition. The perceptual and the rational are qualitatively different, but are not divorced from each other; they are unified on the basis of practice. ¹⁶

The first step in the process of cognition is contact with the objects of the external world; this belongs to the stage of perception [sensory stage of cognition]. The second step is to synthesize the data of perception by arranging and reconstructing them; this belongs to the stage of conception, judgment and inference [rational stage of cognition]. ¹⁷

In this way, cognition proceeds from sensory cognition to rational cognition (or logical cognition), and from rational cognition to practice. Now, cognition and practice are not something that take place only once. Mao Ze-dong said “Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level.” ¹⁸cognition (or logical cognition), and from rational cognition to practice. Now, cognition and practice are not something that take place only once. Mao Ze-dong said “Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level.” 18

Kant said that cognition takes place insofar as the subject synthesizes the object, and that it is impossible to cognize the “things-in-themselves” behind the phenomena, advocating agnosticism. In contrast, Marxism asserted that the essence of things can be known only through phenomena, and that things can be known fully through practice, thus rejecting Kant’s notion of “things-in-themselves.” About Kant, Engels said the following:

In Kant’s time, our knowledge of natural objects was indeed so fragmentary that he might well suspect, behind the little we knew about each of them, a mysterious “thing-in-itself.” But one after another these ungraspable things have been grasped, analyzed, and, what is more, reproduced by the giant progress of science; and what we can produce we certainly can not consider as unknowable. ¹⁹

Now, in the continuing process of cognition and practice, practice is held to be of greater importance. Mao Ze-dong said, “The dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge places practice in the primary position, holding that human knowledge can in no way be separated from practice.” ²⁰ Practice usually refers to human action on nature and social activities, but in Marxism, revolution is held to be the supreme form of practice among all kinds of practice. Therefore, it can be said that the ultimate purpose of cognition is revolution. In fact, Mao Ze-dong said, “The active function of knowledge manifests itself not only in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge, but―and this is more important―it must manifest itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice.” ²¹

Let us next consider the forms of thought in logical cognition (rational cognition). Logical cognition refers to such acts of thinking as judgment and inference, which are mediated by concepts, and in which the forms of thought play an important role. Marxism, which advocates copy theory, regards the forms of thought as the reflection of the processes in the objective world upon the consciousness, that is, as the reflection of existing forms. Among the categories (forms of existence, forms of thought) in Marxism, there are the following: ²²

Absolute Truth and Relative Truth

Knowledge, according to Marx, grows through the successive repetition of cognition and practice. That knowledge grows means that the content of knowledge is enriched, and that the accuracy of knowledge is enhanced. Therefore, the relativity and absoluteness of knowledge becomes an issue. Marxism says that truth is what reflects objective reality correctly. It says that, “If our sensations, perceptions, notions, concepts and theories correspond to objective reality, if they reflect it faithfully, we say that they are true, while true statements, judgments or theories are called the truth.” ²³

Furthermore, Marxism asserts that practice―ultimately revolutionary practice―is the standard of truth. In order to know whether or not cognition is true, all one needs to do is to compare it with reality and ascertain that cognition concurs with reality. Of this, Marx said, “Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice,” ²⁴ and Mao Ze-dong said, “Man’s social practice [class struggle in particular] alone is the criterion of the truth of his knowledge of the external world.” ²⁵ In sum, revolutionary practice is the criterion of the truth of knowledge. According to Marxism, knowledge in a particular period is partial, imperfect, and remains as only relative truth, but with the progress of science, knowledge approaches absolute truth to an infinite degree. Thus, Marxism affirms the existence of absolute truth. Concerning this, Lenin says, “There is no impassable boundary between relative and absolute truth.” ²⁶ Also, the elements which are absolutely true are contained within relative truths, and as they are accumulated steadily, they become absolute truth, according to Marxism. ²⁷

This concludes my explanation about the traditional epistemologies. As mentioned earlier, I introduced, in summary form, certain traditional epistemologies for the reader’s reference.