4. Modern Views of Value
In the modern period, little of significance has emerged with regard to views of value. Modern views of value can basically be understood as extensions or transformations of the Greek philosophical and Christian views of value.
René Descartes (1596-1650) began by doubting all established traditional values. He was not a skeptic, however. Rather, he attempted to find something steadfast through his doubt. As a result, he reached the fundamental principle of “I think, therefore, I am.” He held human reason to be the basis for one’s judgments. That gave rise to Descartes’ moral teaching that human beings should act with a resolute will while controlling their passions through reason.
Blaise Pascal (1623-62) regarded the human being as a contradictory being, possessing greatness as well as silliness. He expressed this by saying that “Man is a thinking reed.” Human beings are the weakest of all beings in nature, but they are the greatest by virtue of their ability to think. Still, he held, their true happiness consists not in using reason but rather in reaching God through faith, namely, through heart. 13
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) discussed, in his Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgment, how truth, goodness, and beauty might be established, and asserted that we should seek after these values. Especially with regard to goodness, or morality, he asserted that we should act according to the unconditional moral imperative, for example, “be honest”―that is, the categorical imperative, which comes from practical reason.
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) thought that happiness is the state of the absence of pain. Thus, on the basis of the principle of “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” he advocated utilitarianism. He reasoned that the value of human behavior can be determined by calculating pleasure and pain quantitatively. Bentham’s utilitarianism was a theory of value that came into being in the context of the Industrial Revolution. It can be regarded as a Hyungsang view of value.
Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55) advocated three stages of existence, saying that people should pass through the “aesthetic stage” and the “ethical stage” in order to reach the “religious stage” of existence. He asserted that people should not live merely for pleasure; in his view, it is not sufficient merely to live conscientiously by observing ethics; rather, people should live in faith, standing before God. Kierkegaard tried to revive the true Christian view of value.
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) regarded Europe at the end of the nineteenth century as being in an era of nihilism, in which all values were collapsing. He described Christianity as a “slave morality,” that is, as a morality that rejects the strong and equalizes human beings. He regarded Christianity as the greatest cause of the rise of nihilism. So, he presented a new theory of value with the “will to power” as its standard. “Live strongly in this godless world,” was Nietzsche’s assertion.
Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915), of the Neo-Kantian school, dealt with values as the central issue of philosophy, taking up the values of truth, goodness, and beauty in a united way. Following Kant, who had distinguished matters of fact from matters of right, Windelband distinguished judgments of fact from judgments of value, and said that the task of philosophy was to deal with judgments of value.
A judgment of fact is an objective proposition about a fact, whereas a judgment of value is a proposition in which a subjective appraisal of a fact is made. For example, such propositions as “this flower is red” and “the man built the house” are factual judgments; whereas such propositions as “this flower is beautiful” and “that man’s conduct is good” are value judgments. Ever since, fact and value have been dealt with as quite separate issues, in the sense that factual judgments are dealt with in the natural sciences, whereas value judgments are dealt with in philosophy.
The twentieth century saw the rise of analytical philosophy, which employs the “logical analysis of language” as the most appropriate method of philosophy. With regard to axiology, analytical philosophy took the following position: (1) One can not know values except through intuition; (2) Judgment of value is but an expression of the speaker’s feelings about moral approval or disapproval; (3) Axiology is significant only for the analysis of value language. Thus, analytical philosophy generally sought to exclude axiology from philosophy.
Pragmatism, represented by John Dewey (1859-1952), based value judgments on usefulness for life. Such value concepts as truth, goodness, and beauty were regarded as means, or tools, for processing things effectively. From this standpoint, what is perceived as valuable differs from person to person. Even the same person may differ in the way he or she perceives value from time to time. Dewey’s standpoint was a relative pluralism as far as value was concerned.
Lastly, I will mention the Communist view of value. This view of value was defined by B. P. Tugarinov as follows: “Value is a phenomenon of nature or society that is useful and necessary for those people who belong to a particular society or class in history, as something actual, as a purpose, or as an ideal.” 14 In Communism, usefulness for the proletariat class is the standard of value. A postulate of the Communist view of value was that all the established religious values, which were regarded as bourgeois views of value, had to be denied and destroyed. For Communism, a moral act is an act that is useful in promoting collective life for constructing a communist society. It includes such virtues as dedication, obedience, sincerity, love for comrades, and mutual help.