3. Analytic Philosophy

View of Ethics in Analytic Philosophy

According to analytic philosophy, the task of philosophy is not to establish any specific world view, but rather to make philosophy itself a scientific discipline by engaging in a logical analysis of language. The Cambridge Analytic School, with such scholars as George E. Moore (1873-1958), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951); the Logical Positivism of Vienna School, with such scholars as Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Rudolph Carnap (1891-1971) and Alfred J. Ayer (1910-71); and the Ordinary Language School of Britain―all of these are referred to as schools of analytic philosophy.

Among the representative ethical theories of analytic philosophy, we can include the “intuitionism” of Moore and the “emotive theory” of Schlick and Ayer.

According to Moore, goodness can not be defined. He argued: “My point is that ‘good’ is a simple notion, just as ‘yellow’ is a simple notion; that, just as you can not, by any manner or means, explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you can not explain what good is.” ⁷ Moore said further, “If I am asked ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter.” ⁸ He stated that good can only be grasped by intuition, and argued that value judgments are entirely independent from factual judgments.

According to Schlick and Ayer, goodness is no more than a word expressing a subjective feeling and a quasi-idea that can not be verified objectively. Accordingly, an ethical proposition such as, “It is bad to steal money,” is nothing but the speaker’s expression of a feeling of moral disapproval and can not be regarded as either true or false.

Unification Thought Appraisal of Analytic Philosophy’s Perspective of Ethics

The characteristic feature of analytic philosophy’s view of ethics is its separation of factual judgments from value judgments. From the viewpoint of Unification Thought, however, factual judgments and value judgments are both objective, and they can be seen as the two sides of a single coin. Yet, since a factual judgment is a judgment concerning phenomena that can be recognized by anyone, it is characterized by an objectivity that can easily be grasped. In contrast, a value judgment is advocated by a limited number of, for example, religious people or philosophers, and is not necessarily understood by everyone―which gives the impression that a value judgment is purely subjective.

If the spiritual level of human beings becomes enhanced, and the law of value operating throughout the entire universe comes to be understood clearly by all people, then value judgments would also come to be recognized as universally valid.

Natural science has been dealing only with factual judgments, and has been pursuing cause-and-effect relationships in things. Today, however, science has reached the point where it is no longer possible to thoroughly understand natural phenomena solely through the pursuit of cause-and-effect relationships. Scientists are now seeking the meaning behind, or the reason for, natural phenomena. This means that scientists have come to the point of pursuing value judgments in addition to factual judgments. It is the view of Unification Thought that fact and value, or science and ethics, must be approached as one united theme.

Another characteristic feature among the proponents of analytic philosophy is that they have regarded goodness as something undefinable, a quasi-idea. From the Unification Thought perspective, however, goodness can be clearly defined. In sum, human beings have the clear purpose of realizing God’s love through the family four position foundation; thus, behavior in agreement with this purpose is good. Since such goodness is evaluated in actual life, value and fact can not be separated.